# Topicality

First is Topicality

Interpretation-

####  ‘or’ means only one country

**Quirk 93** (Randolph, Professor of Linguistics – University of Durham, and Sidney Greenbaum, “A University Grammar of English”, http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/conjunctions.htm)

OR To suggest that only one possibility can be realized, excluding one or the other: "You can study hard for this exam or you can fail." To suggest the inclusive combination of alternatives: "We can broil chicken on the grill tonight, or we can just eat leftovers. To suggest a refinement of the first clause: "Smith College is the premier all-women's college in the country, or so it seems to most Smith College alumnae." To suggest a restatement or "correction" of the first part of the sentence: "There are no rattlesnakes in this canyon, or so our guide tells us." To suggest a negative condition: "The New Hampshire state motto is the rather grim "Live free or die." [http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/conjunctions.htm - top](http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/conjunctions.htm#top) To suggest a negative alternative without the use of an imperative (see use of and [above](http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/conjunctions.htm#above)): "They must approve his political style or they wouldn't keep electing him mayor."

#### Violation- they engage with all three countries.

#### Limits- they explode limits, allow multiple combinations of affirmative.

#### Topic edu- we cant indepth research every country specifically

#### Ground we loose agent CPs and Disads based on other DAs

#### Topicality is a voting isuee for fairness and jurisdiction.

# Brazil

#### The Federative Republic of Brazil should increase government to government economic engagement with Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela.

#### **Brazil solves- provides the best leadership in Latin America**

Gratius, Associated Professor for international relations at the Complutense University in Madrid, and Saraiva, Rio Branco Chair in International Relations, 13

(Susanne Gratius and Miriam Gomes Saraiva, June 4, 2013, “Continental Regionalism: Brazil’s prominent role in the Americas”, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=164758> accessed 9/8/13, TM)

 The new millennium is somewhat different. The global scenario is more fragmented, marked by a trend towards multi-polarisation, and the global economy has been hit first by the financial crisis that struck the US in 2008, and now with even more serious impacts from the euro crisis. The problems inside the European Union have damaged the credibility of the European regional integration model, and cast into doubt both the economic strategy adopted thus far and the very future of integration in the continent and beyond. This new reality has paved the way for the rise of new players and contrasting worldviews from the liberalism that prevailed in the 1990s: different conceptions and priorities towards certain deep-rooted principles in the West, such as the responsibility to protect, democracy and human rights. In South America, the emergence, since the early 2000s, of new left-wing governments keen to bring about political reform, reducing these countries’ alignment with the United States, and the powerful crisis in Argentina, weakening its influence in the region, have given Brazil more scope for autonomy in the region. 1. Brazil’s foreign policy between global and regional projection In these times of change in the shaping of a new world order, Brazil has begun to stand out for its assertive participation in international politics, where it has favored anti-hegemonic,[1] multi-polar positions and its increasingly strong leadership in its own region. During the Lula administration from 2003 to 2010, Brazil gradually started step-by-step to shoulder the costs inherent in cooperation, governance and integration in the region.[2] At that time, the Brazilian Development Bank BNDES – with a total budget that exceeds that of the Inter-American Development Bank – began to finance infrastructure projects in South American. [3] The election of Lula da Silva at the end of 2002 and the ensuing rise of an autonomy-oriented group in Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs cast the country’s foreign policy in a new light.[4] Diplomatic support for existing international regimes in the 1990s gave way to a proactive push towards modifying these regimes in favour of southern countries or Brazil’s particular interests, which was defined by Lima as soft revisionism.[5] The idea of bringing other emerging or poorer southern countries on board to counterbalance the might of traditional Western powers served as the basis for the country’s international actions. While coalitions with emerging partners helped boost Brazil’s global pretensions, [6] its diplomatic efforts were geared towards bolstering its international standing independently of any other nation, with its role as a global player being firmly grounded in the ideas of autonomy and universalism that were the predominant diplomatic thinking at the time. Alongside Brazil’s international rise, its leadership in South America also started to be seen as a priority. Indeed, the moves to boost its global and regional projection came simultaneously and were seen by Brazil as mutually beneficial. The cooperation with its regional neighbors was perceived by policy-makers as the best way for Brazil to realize its potential, support economic development and form a bloc with stronger international influence. The creation of the South American Defence Council and the Brazilian command of the UN peacekeeping force in Haiti, whose troops are drawn from different countries in the region, were seen as helping Brazil towards a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. According to Flemes, in its upward progress in a new, more multi-polar world order, Brazil would need regional clout in global negotiations, but would not be tied down to any form of institutionalization that might restrict its autonomy.[7]

#### UQ- Brazil’s influence over Latin America high now – US policy absence

Gratius, Associated Professor for international relations at the Complutense University in Madrid, and Saraiva, Rio Branco Chair in International Relations, 13

(Susanne Gratius and Miriam Gomes Saraiva, February 2013, “Continental Regionalism:

Brazil’s prominent role in the Americas”, accessed 8/28/13, [http://aei.pitt.edu/40231/1/WD\_No\_374\_Brazil's\_Continental\_Regionalism.pdf](http://aei.pitt.edu/40231/1/WD_No_374_Brazil%27s_Continental_Regionalism.pdf), ST)

A fourth step in Brazil’s strategy was to expand the country’s interests to Central America and the Caribbean. Once its prominent role in South America and on the global stage had been consolidated, Brazil’s political elites began to draw more attention to Central America and the Caribbean, which had been traditionally under the influence of the United States. An important strategic movement (and alternative to US sanctions policy) was the renewal of relations with Cuba. Historical political affinities between the Workers’ Party and Castroism motivated closer bilateral relations and economic cooperation. 22 In 2004, Brazil assumed the military command of the UN mission in Haiti. Although its engagement in Haiti had more to do with its aspiration to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it helped to foster Brazil’s relations with the Caribbean. In 2009, rather by accident (the former president Manuel Zelaya chose the Brazilian Embassy in which to escape from his adversaries), the former Lula government got involved in the political crisis in Honduras after the military coup against the elected President Zelaya. This pro-active policy of the Brazilian government illustrates a political will to think about neighborhood policy beyond South America. Latin America is the fourth (and less relevant) cycle of Brazil’s regional policy. The prominence of the autonomy-oriented group or ‘developmentalist faction’ in the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the post-Washington consensus in the region (meaning a major role of the state as a social and economic agent) paved the way for new regional priorities. Not economic integration but political consultation and diplomacy are today’s cornerstones of Latin American integration. Under the Lula Presidency, closer relations with Cuba, Brazil’s military command of the UN stabilization mission in Haiti and its diplomatic influence in the political crisis in Honduras contributed to give the country a higher regional profile and status. It was also Brazil, together with Venezuela that pushed for the transformation of the dialogue forum Rio Group into the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (Celac), which held its first meeting in Brazil and was officially created in 2011 in Caracas. Today, Brasilia’s regional policy is no longer limited to its own sphere of influence but increasingly includes Central America and the Caribbean, the traditional backyard of the United States. There was no agreement with the United States over how regional issues should be dealt with, but the absence of a US policy for the region prevented any stand-off between the two countries. The Brazilian government has operated autonomously whenever issues relating to the continent have arisen. Washington’s low-profile in Latin America and the concentration of a few countries of strategic interest (Colombia, Central America and Mexico) facilitated Brazil’s proactive Latin American policy. The Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) project was the last attempt to design a hemispheric project. Its failure at the Summit in Mar del Plata in 2005 proved the limits of Washington’s traditional hegemony in the Americas and contributed to a stronger regional profile of its rival in the South. Without a hemispheric project, the Organization of American States (OAS) “lacks a guiding vision”23 and lost appeal in Latin America. Although the OAS is still the most consolidated collective institution in the Americas, it lacks both leadership and followers. Moreover, a serious financial crisis is further weakening the traditional organization. Brazil is promoting regional concentration outside the traditional framework instead of increasing its weight in the inter-American environment, which reflects a US hegemony. Against that background, Brazil perceives regional integration not only as a goal in itself but also as an instrument for autonomy and ‘soft-balancing’ the United States. 24 Thus, its attitude towards integration is not free of self-interest. Apart from common regional goals, the country also seeks to implement a neighborhood policy that serves Brazil’s power aspirations in South America and the Americas.

#### Link- Sole Brazilian influence on Latin America is key to Brazilian regional influence

Gratius, PhD in Political Science from the University of Hamburg and the University Complutense of Madrid, 7

(Susanne Gratius, “Brazil in the Americas: A Regional Peace Broker?”, April 2007, accessed 8/29/13, <http://www.fride.org/download/WP35_BraAmer_ENG_abr07.pdf>, ST)

On the other hand, Brazil and the US advance competing projects for South America. Washington signs free trade agreements with the Andean subregion and regrets MERCOSUR’s development; while Brazil wants to create a political alliance in South America that could become a relevant trade bloc. MERCOSUR and CASA are Brazil’s weapons to undermine US influence in the region, since Brazil ‘has always been a containment force against American imperialist ambitions’. Both countries play different roles in the Americas: the US is the hegemonic power; Brazil is a regional cooperative one. Brazil’s leadership style lends it an advantageous position, since its regional acceptance as a key actor in the prevention and resolution of conflicts is much better than that of the US, which acts unilaterally and through hard power. This, coupled with the gradual US retreat from Latin American affairs (which does not represent a threat to national or international security) creates a new space for Brazil: ‘the consensual approach to leadership [...] provides another avenue for understanding how a middle or emerging power might marshal support for a clearly defined project that is not favored by traditional power centres’.79 Another factor influencing a more pronounced Brazilian political leadership is the US’ reduced influence in the OAS, especially since José Miguel Insulza’s election as Secretary General. For the first time, the main regional organisation is led by a candidate who did not have US backing; furthermore, he represents South-American interests and maintains close ties with Brazil. Its distant political and geographical relationship with the US, although not necessarily mistaken, has meant that Brazil has not played an important role in the OAS, clearly viewed by Itamaraty as US-dominated space, with interests closely linked to its headquarters in Washington.

#### Brazilian cooperative hegemony is the only way to solve inter/intra-state conflicts – promotes peace through alliances

Gratius, PhD in Political Science from the University of Hamburg and the University Complutense of Madrid, 7

(Susanne Gratius, “Brazil in the Americas: A Regional Peace Broker?”, April 2007, accessed 8/29/13, <http://www.fride.org/download/WP35_BraAmer_ENG_abr07.pdf>, ST)

Since the return to democracy, the political elite has avoided any hint that might suggest a Brazilian regional leadership, trying to project the country as an anti-hegemonic cooperative power. Since the eighties there has been a significant change in Brazilian foreign policy towards a consensual, cooperative policy, by means of alliances with other South American countries, particularly Argentina.This represents a new diplomatic style of neighbourhood cooperation. Unlike the unilateralism of the US, its main rival in the Americas, Brazil has chosen a ‘consensual style of leadership’ expressed to a certain extent, by regional understatement. The idea of a united South America is a counterproject to a US-dominated North America (including Central America and Mexico). Brazil presents itself as an anti-hegemonic power in the region. A leadership based on the values of cooperation, moderation and regional institutions is the only way Brazil can gain influence, given its modest resources and the predominance of the US in the American continent. Brazil can only create some counter-weight to Washington together with other South American countries, within the framework of regional multilateralism and through integration. As its uses soft instruments to achieve hard objectives (the creation in the long-run of a South American counter-power), Brazil could be classified as a ‘cooperative hegemony’. The latter has power aggregation capacity, power-sharing capacity and commitment capacity.69 The power-sharing capacity (with Argentina) is most prominent in the case of Brazil, which is not hegemonic but rather a regional middle power that acts with other countries. Since Brazil is not a nuclear power, nor does it have large military resources, Brazil is a soft power committed to civic values such as peace, democracy, and integration or cooperation among states. As a civil power it does not seek military domination in Latin America, a region without inter-state conflicts but plagued with intra-state or ‘intermestic’ conflicts, hardly solvable through military means. With its cooperative approach, Brazil could, in the long-run, be more effective in contributing to conflict prevention and resolution in the region than the US, whose military approach in the Andean region tends to increase the levels of violence70. However, a clear limitation of the actions of both countries is the scarce resources they offer to social development in Latin America- unlike the EU, who is Latin America’s main donor. Brazil’s rejection of hard power is based on the conviction that it cannot operate alone, but it needs to create alliances with other countries to reach its objectives. Thus, Brazil uses or creates regional institutions (permanent or ad-hoc). Regional integration is therefore considered, on the one hand, a (less expensive) vehicle of power aggregation and, on the other, a peace doctrine or an instrument to prevent inter-state conflicts. The latter is closely linked to the European integration experience that partly serves as a model for Brazil and its South American project. The creation of MERCOSUR and CASA demonstrate Brazil’s increasing influence in the region. Even though they are fragmented projects still under construction and little institutionalized, they reflect the advances of the Brazilian idea of a united South America, politically separated from the rest of the continent. By committing countries to common values and interests, and by facilitating their access to material resources, integration is also an important instrument for political and economic regional stabilization. Nevertheless, there is a gap between Brazil’s new role and the available resources. Some argue that ‘its ambitions go beyond its material capacity’.71Despite a certain level of imbalance among the ‘multiple initiatives’, their implementation and the allocation of resources,72 it must be remembered that Brazil is an emerging regional power. Very little time has passed since Lula came to power and Brazil assumed a more active role in the diplomatic management of internal crizes in its geographical surroundings. Slowly,Brazil begins to confront the social, economic, political and cultural costs of regional leadership.Thus, it accepted the financial and political costs (criticism for ‘violating’ national sovereignty) of military leadership of MINUSTAH. As regards MERCOSUR, Brazil will finance a large part of the Structural Convergence Fund (FOCEM) that benefits the less developed partners. This cost also implies a delay in, or the cancellation of, the signing of a free trade agreement with the EU and the US. An additional political cost is the subordination of sovereignty to MERCOSUR institutions (the Parliament and the Committee of Permanent Representatives). Finally, the increasing hispanicization of Brazil is a cultural cost of its regional project.73 Even though MERCOSUR or CASA cannot be compared to the EU, the fact that Brazil promotes common institutions that do not reflect its weight in the respective blocs means a strong commitment to integration and a shared regional leadership.Therefore, Brazil has both a power-sharing and a commitment capacity. Less clear is its power aggregation capacity, above all, in the face of its rivals in the Americas.

#### **Latin American intra-state conflicts spillover and causes terrorism, violence, and radicalism**

Ruiz-Dana et. al, MALD in International Economic and Commercial Law at Tufts University, 7

 (Alejandra Ruiz-Dana, Peter Goldschagg, Edmundo, Claro and Hernán Blanco, “Regional Integration: Trade and Conflict in Latin America”, January 2007, accessed 8/29/13, <http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/tas_rta_latin_america.pdf>, ST)

With the exception of the 1995 war between Peru and Ecuador, internal armed conflicts have been few in Latin America since the 1990s. Tensions and disputes still persist, though. As explained before, the uniqueness of the inter-American cooperation system deters an escalation into full-blown war. Topographical and geographical restraints, weak military institutions and socioeconomic factors also limit the capacity to engage in warfare.56 Still, existing disputes merit some consideration and understanding. With this in mind, a distinction must be made between the traditional and non-traditional disputes. Traditional disputes are ancient in nature. They comprise border/frontier disputes and other areas of historical tension between states. These disputes “have a higher probability of [leading states] to war than other kinds of disputes.”57 Non-traditional disputes are due to new or modern threats to security as a result of the weakening of the State and the consequent rise in internal delinquency and violence. Examples include terrorism and drug trafficking. Hence, these disputes are associated with the spillover effects of an internal problem that has been unsuccessfully contained by the afflicted State. The problem, then, becomes internationalized and, consequently, requires an international response. “Whereas interstate conflict has generally been limited in contemporary Latin American history… intra-state violence has, on the contrary, always been a great problem.”58 Again, ideological and institutional factors are behind this occurrence, which, in turn, also explains the relatively low levels of defense spending in the region. This is not to say that territorial disputes are something of the past. Ten of the sixteen disputes registered in the Latin American and Caribbean region are latent.59 Still, contrary to common assumption, territorial disputes are “not a necessary condition for militarization in the relations between these states.”60 Intrastate violence or turmoil, on the other hand, is mostly explained by persistent political and economic instability. The most visible and damaging of these intrastate conflicts is Colombia’s civil war. The intensity of the conflict there is such that some spillover effects are already evident in the neighbouring countries.61 According to a report by the US National Council on Intelligence, the main threat towards security in the region is posed by the failure of governments to alleviate extreme poverty in spite of “the greater integration into the global economy in the past decade.”62 This failure could spark populism and radical indigenous action. Recent estimates indicate that “violence has globally increased in Latin America because of poverty and criminality. In the year 2000, the crime rate in Latin America was the double of the world average (22.5 per 1000 versus 10.7).”63 Addressing this violence in order to preclude its destabilizing effect will be a mighty task given the frailty of many Latin American regimes.

#### c. Terrorism causes extinction – draws in Russia and China

Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies, 10

(Robert Ayson, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, **there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should** ever **be regarded as** belonging in the category of truly **existential** threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. **But** these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially **an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more** of the **states** that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, **if the act** of nuclear terrorism **came as a complete surprise**, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) **suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries** like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in **Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea**, perhaps **Iran** if its program continues, and possibly **Pakistan**. But at what stage would **Russia and China** be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred **against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and**/or **China**, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, **would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst?** Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. **The reverse** might well **apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China** during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, **could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures** that might rise **domestically to consider the U**nited **S**tates **as a possible perpetrator** or encourager of the attack**?** **Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack** on its own soil might also **raise the possibility of an unwanted** (and **nuclear** aided) **confrontation** with Russia and/or China. For example**, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality**, it is just possible that **Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use** force (and possibly **nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow**, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) **Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group**. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, **Russia and**/or **China might interpret such action as** being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as **an infringement on their spheres of influence and** even on their **sovereignty**. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? **In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might** even go so far as to **interpret** this **concern as a tacit form of** sympathy or **support for the terrorists. This might not help** the chances of **nuclear restraint**.

# Politics

#### Immigration reform will pass- bipartisan focus.

Sherfinski Washington times, 11/14/13 (David, politics at Washington times, “Schumer: Immigration reform still possible this year” <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/nov/14/sen-charles-schumer-immigration-reform-still-possi/> accessed 11/14/13 KR)

Sen. Charles E. Schumer, New York Democrat, said Thursday that he’d bet “quite a bit” that comprehensive immigration reforming will pass Congress and that he wouldn’t rule out something happening by the end of the year.

“I still think it’s possible this year,” he said at the Washington Ideas Forum hosted by The Atlantic. “But if it’s not, I think we have a real good chance to do it in the first half of next year. … If I had to bet money, we’re going to have an immigration reform bill on the president’s desk.”

Mr. Schumer was part of a bipartisan group that wrote a bill the Senate passed earlier this year to provide a pathway to citizenship for millions of people currently living in the country illegally.

House Speaker John A. Boehner, Ohio Republican, firmly rejected the Senate’s approach Wednesday, which called for quick legal status for most illegal immigrants, though it withheld a full pathway to citizenship until after the Homeland Security Department invested in more Border Patrol agents, doubled the length of pedestrian fencing along the U.S.-Mexico border, and purchased more equipment and technology.

The Senate bill also would revamp the legal immigration system to let in more foreigners based on job skills or deep family ties.

Mr. Schumer said in a statement Wednesday that he thought the Republican-dominated House would “come to its senses and realize that we have to fix our immigration system in a bipartisan way.”

#### Cuba policy is unpopular.

LeoGrande, 12

William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.

#### Venezuela’s unpopular – GOP and Cuba lobby see it as appeasement

Mazzei, 12 Patricia, and Erika Bolstad, Miami Herald, 7/11/12, <http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/07/11/v-fullstory/2891728/republicans-attack-obama-for-chavez.html>

Mitt Romney, GOP howl over President Barack Obama’s remark about Hugo Chávez Republicans criticize President Obama for saying Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has not threatened U.S. national security. The region’s experts, however, side with Obama. Republicans, led by Mitt Romney and Florida Sen. Marco Rubio, pounced on President Barack Obama on Wednesday after he told a Miami TV anchor that Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez does not pose a “serious” national security threat to the United States. Republicans wasted no time in firing up a key South Florida constituency coveted by both Romney and Obama: Cuban-American voters who hate Chávez for his close ties to the Castro regime in Cuba. “President Obama hasn’t been paying attention if he thinks that Hugo Chávez, with buddies like the regimes in Cuba, Iran, and Syria, drug cartels, arms traffickers, and extremist groups, is not a threat to the United States,” said Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Miami, chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs committee and co-chair of Romney’s National Hispanic Steering Committee. “I am deeply disappointed that this administration continues to bury its head in the sand about threats to U.S. security, our interests, and our allies.” Rubio said Obama “has been living under a rock” when it comes to Chávez, and said the president “continues to display an alarmingly naïve understanding of the challenges and opportunities we face in the western hemisphere.” Other Cuban-American lawmakers issued statements in the same critical vein, and Senate candidate Connie Mack, a Republican congressman from Fort Myers, tied his opponent Sen. Bill Nelson, D-Fla., to the president’s remarks. Experts in the region, though, called Obama’s comments reasonable. Chávez is “certifiable,” with a tremendous ego fueled by the power that comes from sitting on vast oil reserves — but he’s not as dangerous as the leaders of other less friendly regimes, said Riordan Roett, the director of Latin American Studies Program at the School of Advanced International Studies at The Johns Hopkins University. The Republican criticism is “just pure electoral politics,” Roett said. “He poses no security threat to the United States or anyone else,” Roett said. “Hugo Chávez is not going to attack us, he’s not going to occupy our embassy, he’s not going to bomb U.S. planes arriving in Caracas at Maiquetía Airport. He is a loudmouth who enjoys listening to himself, and has built up on the basis of oil revenue, a very, very populist, dependent regime that can’t deliver on basic services, on goods and commodities to his own people.” Here’s what Obama told Oscar Haza, a Spanish-language broadcast journalist and anchor in an interview with Obama that aired Tuesday night on A Mano Limpia (which roughly translates to “The Gloves Are Off”), Haza’s nightly show on WJAN-Channel 41: “We’re always concerned about Iran engaging in destabilizing activity around the globe,” Obama said. “But overall my sense is that what Mr. Chávez has done over the last several years has not had a serious national security impact on us. We have to be vigilant. My main concern when it comes to Venezuela is having the Venezuelan people have a voice in their affairs, and that you end up ultimately having fair and free elections, which we don’t always see.” Romney called Obama’s comment “stunning and shocking” and said in statement it’s a sign of “a pattern of weakness” in the president’s foreign policy. “It is disturbing to see him downplaying the threat posed to U.S. interests by a regime that openly wishes us ill,” Romney said. “Hugo Chávez has provided safe haven to drug kingpins, encouraged regional terrorist organizations that threaten our allies like Colombia, has strengthened military ties with Iran and helped it evade sanctions, and has allowed a Hezbollah presence within his country’s borders.” White House press secretary Jay Carney declined to answer questions about the president’s remarks. The president’s campaign spokesman, Ben LaBolt, said Romney is only “playing into the hands of Chávez” and his “outdated rhetoric” by giving him any attention. “Because of President Obama’s leadership, our position in the Americas is much stronger today than before he took office,” LaBolt said. “At the same time, Hugo Chávez has become increasingly marginalized and his influence has waned. It’s baffling that Mitt Romney is so scared of a leader like Chávez whose power is fading, while Romney continues to remain silent about how to confront al-Qaeda or how to bring our troops home from Afghanistan.” Michael Shifter, president of the Washington D.C.-based think tank Inter-American Dialogue, cautioned that it’s up to the president to judge in an election year whether it’s politically smart to talk about Chávez in a way that draws such heated Republican response in South Florida — especially considering how valuable the swing state’s votes are to Obama’s prospects.

#### PC key to holistic passage – multiple warrants

Martin 7/13 [Gary, Congressional journalist, “Democrats Stepping up Immigration Bill Debate,” Times Union, 2013, <http://www.timesunion.com/news/article/Democrats-stepping-up-immigration-bill-debate-4664043.php>] \*\*\*PC key to: -Recapture momentum -Gain public support -Spur industry backing -Increase public knowledge -Empirics\*\*\*

Obama told the Congressional Hispanic Caucus that he planned to increase his public role in the debate. Supporters of comprehensive immigration reform welcome the boost. A bipartisan bill that includes a path to citizenship sailed through the Senate last month. But immigration reform hit strong headwinds in the House, where GOP lawmakers support a slow-paced process, with a patchwork of separate bills to strengthen border security and increase visas for agricultural and high-tech workers coming before any consideration of citizenship. "A vast majority of our members do believe we have to wrestle with this problem," said House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio. "They also believe that we need to do this step-by-step, common-sense approach." Despite the quick action in the Senate, Republicans said there is little chance that legislation other than border-security bills would be taken up by the House before its month-long recess in August. "We are going back to our districts and talk to our constituents," said Rep. John Fleming, R-La. The Obama administration and Democrats are preparing to use the upcoming weeks to recapture some of the lost momentum. Instead of campaign tactics targeting Republicans who oppose comprehensive immigration, Obama told Congressional Hispanic Caucus members that he wants to use the bully pulpit to build public support. He is planning to address the need for reform to specific industries, and to explain how immigration reform can boost economic growth. Obama feels there is a disconnect, said Rep. Pete Gallego, D-Alpine. "People don't know why immigration reform is relevant," Gallego said. The president will place a spotlight on the problems "so people will understand the stakes." Obama has reached out to Republican leaders in the House and Senate and held private talks on immigration reform. "To get this done requires some level of Republican cooperation," said Rep. Joaquin Castro, D-San Antonio. "He expressed to us that he has reached out to leaders in the House and intends on doing that some more." Obama has used the power of the presidency to highlight the need for immigration reform before. Earlier this year he used a campaign-style event in Nevada, a presidential swing state, to lay out his vision of an immigration reform bill and eventual citizenship for undocumented immigrants here illegally. Obama also spoke on the issue in his State of the Union address, urging Congress to act this year on a bill that includes both citizenship and border-security provisions. "He has used the tools in his toolbox to help bring us to the point where we have a bipartisan bill that cleared the Senate and progress in the House," said White House spokesman Jay Carney. Carney said the White House would make future decisions about "what the president does, who he talks to, and how he addresses the issue in accordance with what we think will help move this ball down the field." Many Democrats say the way to build support for the bill is to campaign for its passage in regions with agricultural, hospitality, high-tech and construction industries that would benefit from immigration reform.

#### **C**IR is key to reducing structural violence against immigrants

Banuelas 10

(Arturo Banuelas, October 2010 U.S. Catholic, “The lies are killing us: The need for immigration reform”, <http://www.uscatholic.org/culture/social-justice/2010/10/lies-are-killing-us-need-immigration-reform>, 10/26/13, VG)

Immigrants like Marisol show us that immigration reform is more than simply a matter of human rights for undocumented immigrants. It is a matter of survival for the poorest. No child of God should ever have to leave her family at 5 years of age to be able to eat and survive in our world. Like the majority of people who cross the border, these are not terrorists or drug smugglers but our brothers and sisters.

The growing anti-immigrant sentiment in our country since 9/11 did not happen because people suddenly wanted to become cruel and heartless. It began because people started believing a lie about who we Latinos are, both documented and undocumented.

This is why immigration is a defining issue that is about us—all of us Latinos—and about how we will shape the future of our church and our country. There is a saying in Spanish, "La mentira nos trae la muerte." Lies bring death.

The lie is that immigrants, and by association all of us Latinos, are disposable as human beings and not worthy of human dignity and respect. And this lie is killing us.

An immigrant recently told me, "I've been sacrificing myself for my family, but in this country I am worth nothing." Latinos and immigrants encounter racism, resentment, and extreme hostilities against them, and they masquerade as patriotism and now also as national security.

By now we are familiar with the countless problems immigrants endure as a result of this lie: an increase in border deaths to more than 400 a year; raids, arrests, and deportations separating families; a backlog in family reunification and visa requests; militarization of the border; sexual exploitation of women immigrants traveling north; abuses in detention centers.

Arizona has recently made national headlines for passing harsh anti-immigrant laws, but today more than 20 states have introduced even harsher laws than Arizona. The solutions these laws propose perpetuate lies, persecute innocent people, expose all of us Latinos to racial profiling, and cause death and suffering to the poor. Those who say that they are not against immigrants yet support such oppressive laws are practicing backdoor racism at its worst.

Sure, every nation has a right to protect its borders against impending threats, but immigrants working to feed their children are not a threat to anyone. Their presence is not a threat, it is a human right; and we support their right to a better life.

Many today scapegoat the poor for self-serving political gain, for economic greed, and security fears. Their lies blind people from seeing Christ in others and keep them from hearing the gospel call to hospitality of the stranger among us. These lies are being used to justify injustice and foster racism that causes pervasive exploitation of immigrants, who are demonized as illegal, as alien, as suspicious human beings.

Since the majority of the more than 90 nationalities that daily cross our borders are from the Americas, it is our Latinidad itself that is being attacked. We know that the root causes of immigration include extreme poverty, unemployment, political and military corruption, and government instability in the countries of origin. However, we Latinos and Latinas throughout the Americas also know that the United States shares in the responsibility for these conditions that drive immigrants north across our borders.

It is not a secret that once the estimated 12 to 20 million currently undocumented immigrants become citizens, our country will be different. This process has already begun, but wait until we get to vote, buy homes, graduate from universities, and become elected officials.

Es mentira, it is a lie that immigrants will not learn English. In our parish we have some 100 people learning English to become citizens, and similar programs exist all over.

Es mentira that all immigrants are here illegally. The truth is that the majority are here on some type of visa.

Es mentira that stronger enforcement along the U.S.-Mexico border will stop immigrants from crossing the border. It is jobs that bring immigrants to the United States.

Es mentira that immigrants are draining our health care and educational systems. The fact is that immigrants contribute about $90 billion in taxes, much more than the $5 billion they use in services.

Despite these lies I feel optimistic because this is our time, this is Latino time. We are coming of age, and we want to help fashion a new nation: one that is more just, equal, and free for all citizens, especially the poorest.
But we will need to do this the Latino way, grounded in a new vision we inherited from our indigenous ancestors, who said, "Tu eres mi otro yo," you are my other self. This is a profound spiritual vision of life, an economic program for justice, a cultural solution for peace, and an authentic reform for human dignity.

Tu eres mi otro yo is the Latino way. We are all linked as one. We stand together, or we fall together. We are each other, and we need to help each other. Our ancestors teach us: If I despise you, I despise myself. And if I promote the good in you, I promote the goodness in me and everyone else.

Our fathers, mothers, and abuelos have always taught what Christ teaches us: that we were made good and for good. When we see life from this decidedly Latino worldview, we discover that there are more good people in the world than bad, that the world is in truth moving toward this oneness. This is the Latino good news.

I believe that our greatest meaning in life comes from our solidarity with others, especially the struggling poorest among us. As long as they do not eat, have health care, get a good education, live in decent housing, get treated with respect and dignity, then we all remain incomplete in ourselves and as a nation.

In a time of such propaganda, lies, drastic poverty, violence, racism, and war, in this time when human life seems so dirt cheap, we must proclaim that each person matters, that they matter enormously to us because tu eres mi otro yo.

As a Latino from the border I have reason to feel optimistic about life and our future because in us we carry this deep Latino desire to live out our God-given oneness; at the end of all our human struggles, we will see that it is our oneness that will win over lies, divisions, hate, and racism. In the end the glory will go to those who know how to embrace tu eres mi otro yo. In the end victory comes in our togetherness.

I look at our Latino history in terms of the biblical story of the Exodus: Some have crossed the sea into the Promised Land of no more borders. Others are still in the water trying to make it to land. And some arrived late and are still wandering in the desert. Moses told them to be at the edge of the sea by 10 a.m., but, being Latino, they arrived at noon. They are still out there dreaming and wondering what it will be like when they get to the other side. Some of them are dying without water, acceptance, lack of health care, food, or shelter.
But today we say, "Come, venganse," we are with you because our ministries represent solidarity in the struggle for human rights for all people.

The divisive border wall exists also in our hearts. When the border fence went up, I was part of a march protesting it. I remember walking up to the ugly steel barrier. I put my fingers through the fence, and I felt deep anger. I wanted to tear it down with my bare hands.

I kept remembering the Raramuri children in our parish missions in Mexico's northern Sierra Tarahumara, who do not have enough to eat, whose fathers and brothers search for ways to feed their families. Holding the fence I remembered their empty stomachs. I could hear Ester ask her mother, "Are we going to eat today?"

Holding the fence in my hands, I said a prayer. I asked Jesus to forgive us. And I asked la Virgen de Guadalupe to protect her children. What the fence says is: "I don't want you to be my other self."

Those of us who live on the border question whether the racial make-up of our families has anything to do with the fact that Canada and the Atlantic and Pacific coasts do not have disgusting walls, yet their combined border miles far exceed our 2,000-mile-long southwest border.

This immoral wall along our border and in our nation's heart is causing moral damage to the nation's soul with long-term consequences far beyond the fears we have of terrorists. It says that we have stopped dreaming of the possibilities to help each other as human beings in the land of the free.

 It says that we have given in to smallness of our hearts because of the fear-filled lies that claim doom when we welcome the strangers in our midst.

This ugly $242 billion wall is a wake-up call that our national leadership has failed to help us and that it is time for us to offer a better vision for national problems. We need to stop the further construction of this wall, tear it down, and make good use of the materials. What we need instead is just, comprehensive immigration reform, which will help America become a decent nation.

This is an historic moment for us. We have never been this close to immigration reform, and we are not backing down because we are not afraid of those who oppose us. I have seen in the faces of Latinos all over the country that we are ready to show our resolve, our conviction, and our dedication to the immigrants and to reform. We want to do what it takes because we deeply believe that justice will triumph over hate, that love will conquer racism, and that common compassion will overcome the lies.

# Solvency

#### Consequences Matter

Isaac 2 — Jeffrey C. Isaac, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University-Bloomington, 2002 (“Ends, Means, and Politics,” *Dissent*, Volume 49, Issue 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via EBSCOhost, p. 35-36)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. [end page 35] This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### No morality d-rule—nations *aren’t* moral actors. Rational self-interest best metric for action.

Kennan 86 — George F. Kennan, Professor Emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University, served as U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1952) and Yugoslavia (1961-1963), 1985 (“Morality and Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1985/1986, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 216)

Second, let us recognize that the functions, commitments and moral obligations of governments are not the same as those [end page 205] of the individual. Government is an agent, not a principal. Its primary obligation is to the interests of the national society it represents, not to the moral impulses that individual elements of that society may experience. No more than the attorney vis-a-vis the client, nor the doctor vis-a-vis the patient, can government attempt to insert itself into the consciences of those whose interests it represents. Let me explain. The interests of the national society for which government has to concern itself are basically those of its military security, the integrity of its political life and the well-being of its people. These needs have no moral quality. They arise from the very existence of the national state in question and from the status of national sovereignty it enjoys. They are the unavoidable necessities of a national existence and therefore not subject to classification as either "good" or "bad." They may be questioned from a detached philosophic point of view. But the government of the sovereign state cannot make such judgments. When it accepts the responsibilities of governing, implicit in that acceptance is the assumption that it is right that the state should be sovereign, that the integrity of its political life should be assured, that its people should enjoy the blessings of military security, material prosperity and a reasonable opportunity for, as the Declaration of Independence puts it, the pursuit of happiness. For these assumptions the government needs no moral justification, nor need it accept any moral reproach for acting on the basis of them.

#### Ontology and epistemology don’t come first- theory driven approaches generalize problems and a plurality of philosophies makes it difficult

Owen 02 (David Owen, Ph.D. Head of the Division of Politics & International Relations, Professor of Social & Political Philosophy at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### The alt doesn’t solve- The K will reproduce the discourse that it seeks to eliminate while failing to create change

roskoski and peabody 1991(matthew and joe, a lingustic and philosophical critique of language and arguments, online: google)

#### If language “arguments” become a dominant trend, debaters will not change their attitudes. Rather they will manifest their attitudes in non-debate contexts. Under these conditions, the debaters will not have the moderating effects of the critic or the other debaters. Simply put, sexism at home or at lunch s worse than sexism in a debate round because in the round there is a critic to provide negative thought not punitive feedback. The publicization effects of censorship are well known. “Psychological studies reveal that whenever the government attempts to censor speech, the censored speech – for that very reason – becomes more appealing to many people.” (Strossen 559). These studies would suggest that language which is critiqued by language “arguments” becomes more attractive simply because of the critique. Hence language “arguments” are counterproductive. Conclusion Rodney Smolla offered the following insightful assessment of the interaction between offensive language and language “arguments”: the battle against {offensive speech} will be fought most effectively through persuasive and creative educational leadership rather than through punishment and coercion… T

#### he sense of a community of scholars, an island of reason and tolerance, is the pervasive ethos. But the ethos should be advanced with education, no coercion. It should be the dominant voice of the universality within the marketplace of ideas; but it should not preempt that marketplace. (Smolla 224-5).1 We emphatically concur. It is our position that a debater who feels strongly enough about a given language and “argument” ought to actualize that belief through impersonal conversation rather than through a plea of censorship and coercion. Each debater in a given round has three minutes of cross-examination time during which he or she may engage the other team in a dialogue about the ramifications of the language the opposition has just used. Additionally even given t the efficacy of Rich Edwards’ efficient tabulation program, there will inevitably be long periods between rounds during which further dialogue can be used.

#### Turn-

#### Cuba is a violator of human rights

Miami Herald 13 — Miami Herald, 2013 (“Human rights under abuse in Cuba,” Editorial, April 22nd, Available Online at http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/04/22/3358813/human-rights-under-abuse-in-cuba.html#storylink=cpy, Accessed 07-03-2013)

The State Department’s latest report on human-rights practices effectively puts the lie to the idea that the piecemeal and illusory changes in Cuba under Gen. Raúl Castro represent a genuine political opening

 toward greater freedom.

If anything, things are getting worse. The report, which covers 2012, says the independent Cuban Commission on Human Rights and Reconciliation counted 6,602 short-term detentions during the year, compared with 4,123 in 2011. In March 2012, the same commission recorded a 30-year record high of 1,158 short-term detentions in a single month just before the visit of Pope Benedict XVI.

Among the many abuses cited by the 2012 report are the prison sentences handed out to members of the Unión Patriotica de Cuba, the estimated 3,000 citizens held under the charge of “potential dangerousness,” state-orchestrated assaults against the Damas de Blanco (Ladies in White), the suspicious death of dissident Oswaldo Payá and so on.

As in any dictatorship, telling the truth is a crime: Independent journalist Calixto Ramón Martínez Arias, the first to report on the cholera outbreak in Cuba, was jailed in September for the crime of desacato (insulting speech) and remained there until last week.

The regime is willing to undertake some meek economic reforms to keep people employed. It has even dared to relax its travel requirements to allow more Cubans to leave the country if they can get a passport.

Both of these are short-term survival measures, designed as escape valves for growing internal pressure. But when it comes to free speech, political activity and freedom of association — the building blocks of a free society — the report is a depressing chronicle of human-rights abuses and a valuable reminder that repression is the Castro regime’s only response to those who demand a genuinely free Cuba. Fundamental reform? Not a chance.

#### Reject engagement with human rights abusers — *moral duty* to shun.

Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B. in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. in Economics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989 (“On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions,” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 17-19)

A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger I want to smash your [end page 17] face, ethics indicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict.

But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions?

We find the answer when we note that there is another "level" of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of "reinforcing … morality," he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting people's rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a duty (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating the rights of others with one's actions but also to support that moral order.

Consider that the moral order itself contributes significantly to people's rights being respected. It does so by encouraging and reinforcing moral behavior and by discouraging and sanctioning immoral behavior. In this moral community people mutually reinforce each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be much more violation of people's rights. Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in.

Certain types of behavior constitute a direct attack on the moral order. When the violation of human rights is flagrant, willful, and persistent, the offender is, as it were, thumbing her nose at the moral order, publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually undermine altogether the moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior into an attack on the moral order.

An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the word means "burning" or "blazing." The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blaze forth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be willful and persistent. We do not consider the actions of the "backslider," the [end page 18] weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentant sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others publicly reaffirm the moral order. When someone flagrantly, willfully, and repeatedly violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral order, the members of the moral community, must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral order. How does shunning do this?

First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announces support for the moral order and backs up the announcement with action. This action reinforces the commitment to the moral order both of the shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this argument in his call for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of 1986.)

Further, shunning may have a moral effect on the shunned person, even if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned person thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make clear to her that she is, in fact, removing herself from that community by the behavior in question. Thus shunning may achieve by moral suasion what cannot be achieved by "force."

Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of moral sanction, whose appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether he deserves the punishment for violating the moral order. Punishment then can be viewed as a way of maintaining the moral order, of "purifying the community" after it has been made "unclean," as ancient communities might have put it.

Yet not every immoral action requires that we shun. As noted above, we live in a fallen world. None of us is perfect. If the argument implied that we may have nothing to do with anyone who is immoral, it would consist of a reductio of the very notion of shunning. To isolate a person, to shun him, to give him the "silent treatment," is a serious thing. Nothing strikes at a person's wellbeing as person more directly than such ostracism. Furthermore, not every immoral act is an attack on the moral order. Actions which are repented and actions which are done out of weakness of will clearly violate but do not attack the moral order. Thus because of the serious nature of shunning, it is defined as a response not just to any violation of the moral order, but to attacks on the moral order itself through flagrant, willful, and persistent wrongdoing.

We can also now see why failure to shun can under certain circumstances suggest complicity. But it is not that we have a duty to shun because failure to do so suggests complicity. Rather, because we have an obligation to shun in certain circumstances, when we fail to do so others may interpret our failure as tacit complicity in the willful, persistent, and flagrant immorality